HUMAN RIGHTS AS PART OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A PLEA FOR CHANGE OF PARADIGMS*
Anthony D'Amato**

I. THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVE VERIFICATION

We can all agree that we are experiencing a rather exhilarating elevation
of consciousness about human rights throughout the world. The question for
us international lawyers is how, and how much of, this public sentiment for
human rights has been transformed into binding international law. There is
no question that some of it has. Prior to 1945 a government would not be
deemed to have violated international law by the mass murder of its own
citizens in its own territory. Josef Stalin's purges of the 1930s resulted in
the deaths of over twenty million Russian citizens-history's worst genocide.
The international community hardly noticed that it was happening.
International lawyers of the time believed that what Stalin did was within the
sovereignty of the Soviet Union, it was a matter of "domestic jurisdiction,"
it was "their business."
The legally significant breakthrough events for human rights were the
Nuremberg trials following the Second World War (establishing that
genocide was a war crime) and the Genocide Convention of 19481 (establishing genocide as a crime under international law whether committed in
time of war or peace.) These events ripped open the veil of sovereignty,
destroying the claim of governments that they were not internationally
accountable for what they did to their own citizens in their own territory.
Other international law prohibitions upon governmental acts within what was
previously "domestic jurisdiction" followed upon the initial breakthrough for
genocide.
These other prohibitions include those listed by Louis Henkin, the keynote
speaker in the Colloquium of which the present essay is a part: genocide,
apartheid ("systematic racial discrimination"), slavery, extra-judicial killing
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or disappearances, and torture or inhuman treatment When the world from
time to time learns of egregious instances of these prohibitions hardly anyone
disputes the proposition that they violate international law.
It is not difficult for professional international lawyers and scholars to
identify the easy, egregious cases. The easy case by definition is uncontroversial. But for every easy case, there are hundreds of peripheral cases that
might or might not fall within the broad prohibitions. How should
international scholars define the vague norms listed by Professor Henkin in
order to present a clearer picture of what kinds of cases they include and
what kinds of cases they exclude? Is human abortion, for example, an
instance of genocide, as many right-to-lifers claim? What about government
funding for abortion-isn't that even closer to genocide because the state is
making a decision that potentially millions of abortions will be facilitated
and funded? Is capital punishment a form of genocide? Does "mass rape"
(as terrible as it is, and as much we may desire it to be included) come
within the definition of genocide?
Is indentured labor a form of slavery? Does international law prohibit
purchasing the work product of indentured labor? Does a nation violate the
anti-slavery norm if it imports goods that were manufactured under
conditions that the importer, but not the exporter, might call "indentured
servitude"?
What are the parameters of torture? Does it have to be "official torture"
to count as a violation of human rights norms, or would torture by
paramilitary or irregular troops, or even a band of criminals, also violate the
anti-torture norm? Is the battering of wives "torture"? And where can one
draw the line between torture and inhumane treatment or punishment?
Professor Henkin lists freedom from "torture or other inhuman treatment or
punishment" as a universal human right.3 For him, at least, there is no need
to draw a line between torture and inhuman treatment or punishment; both
are prohibited. But, then, what constitutes "inhuman treatment or punishment"?
I can think of numerous practices in the United States today that many
thinking people would include within the ambit of that phrase. Capital
punishment, barred in many countries but not in the United States, could be
one prominent example of inhuman punishment. Placing a prisoner in
2
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solitary confinement-depriving the prisoner of human society-is another.
A great deal of the inhuman treatment that occurs in prisons in the United
States is done deliberately but indirectly-prison guards "looking the other
way" as a new inmate is forcibly raped and sodimized by the other prisoners.
What about the widespread sale by prison guards of crack, cocaine, and
heroin to prisoners, creating "junkies" even of inmates who had not engaged
in substance abuse before being imprisoned? What about the provision in
the most recent federal crime bill of "three strikes and you're out"-creating
the possibility of indefinitely long prison sentences even for minor crimes so
long as a person has committed three of them? These and many other
"features" of the American criminal justice system surely can be, and have
been, characterized by thoughtful persons as cruel and inhuman. All of these
are problems of specification. We need to know more than just the words
genocide, slavery, torture, inhuman treatment or punishment. There is no
point arguing over what the proper definitions of these words might be,
because we're talking about the international-law definitions and not
Webster's (nor Henkin's, nor our) definitions.
Thus, we have an important definitional problem. It implies a second,
related problem: where do the definitions come from? We can call this
second problem the source problem. We need to solve the definitional and
source problems at the same time. We need to determine an objective source
for the human rights we're talking about, and then we need to consult the
source for definitions.
We cannot be content with just a list of human rights of the sort that
Professor Henkin gives in his keynote address. There are many other rights
that some people allege to be human rights under international law. What
about, for example, a human right against capital punishment? Or a human
right against arbitrary detention (think of Haitian boat people)? Or a right
of freedom of movement within one's country (a right denied to women in
several Islamic countries)? Or the right to freedom of expression (think
about Salmon Rushdie and the "crime" of blasphemy)? We need an
objectively verifiable international-law source for all human rights if we want
to show that any particular right is part of international law.
Although international scholars in their own studies must show a
grounding of any claimed international legal norms in an objectively
verifiable source, the need is even more important with respect to outsiders.
Although international scholars may not need much convincing that at least
Professor Henkin's core list of human rights are part of international law,
some may have the uneasy feeling that Professor Henkin is preaching to the
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converted.
What about skeptical lawyers who are not international
lawyers-don't they have every right to ask us to prove that human rights
are part of international law binding upon all states? Even some international lawyers, such as Professor Weisburd, a contributor to the present Symposium, justifiably question whether we have shown where our human rights
norms come from and whether they can be objectively proven to be part of
international law.
The first and most convenient place to look for an account of the sources
of human rights law is Professor Henkin's keynote address. Given his
renown in the field of international law, it is and must be an authoritative
statement of the prevailing view of the place of human rights in international
law.' Additionally, Professor Henkin invokes throughout his paper the
authority of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States.6 The Restatement, in turn, derives much of its authority from
the author of the passages cited, Louis Henkin.
I will proceed to argue that Professor Henkin's view of the internationallaw source of human rights stems from a paradigm that governs his account;
I will call it the Sovereignty Paradigm. From within the world-view
represented by this paradigm, Professor Henkin's keynote address deals with
the question whether human rights are part of international law and, if so,
how we know it. I will argue that so long as one remains within the
Sovereignty Paradigm, the answers that issue forth will be incoherent. The
Sovereignty Paradigm must be overthrown because it makes no sense.
I do not intend to criticize Professor Henkin's personal views, nor does my
critique stem from the classic orneriness of a student departing from his
teacher's cherished beliefs. On the contrary, I focus upon Professor
Henkin's interpretation because it is the prevailing paradigm on our subject
and because he has stated it so well. Paradigms are notoriously resistant to
attack; to change them one must effect a change in the entire "world view"
of their proponents.! As Thomas Kuhn has demonstrated, paradigms grip
our imagination and are nearly impossible to dislodge. In Kuhn's account
of the history of science, established scientists hardly ever shed their
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paradigms; rather, it takes a new generation of scientists, whose minds are
not prisoners of the old paradigm, to effectuate its replacement.
Accordingly, the task I face may be hopeless. Perhaps only young readers
are open to my arguments. I certainly have failed to persuade Professor
Henkin over the years, even though he has been familiar with the alternative
point of view that I have been in the process of developing ever since 1962,
the year he agreed to supervise my doctoral dissertation. Since then I have
published aspects of this alternative view, but not all in one place or
comprehensively. The present essay is my first attempt to confront head-on
the school of thought that Professor Henkin's essay represents. I would not
even have attempted it at the present time if Richard Lillich had not invited
me to participate in this Colloquium and then, with his characteristic
gentleness, insisted.

II. THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM
A. The Sources of Human Rights According to Professor Henkin
1. "Non-Conventional Law"
The generally accepted view of international scholars is that there are only
two sources of international law: customary and conventional. Of these,
custom is the only universal source, generating law that is binding on all
nations (including new nations). Conventions simply create law directly for
their signatories (I postpone to the end of this essay the complication that
conventions can also be a source of custom). Other misnamed "sources,"
such as the decisions of international and national courts and the writings of
publicists, at best are interpretive; they do not directly create law.'

8 See Karl Doehring, The Participationof Internationaland National Courts in the LawCreating Process, 17 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1991-92), excerpted in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY 102 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994) [hereinafter INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY]; Louis
Sohn, Equity in InternationalLaw, 82 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 277 (1988), excerpted in
INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY at 102; Anthony D'Amato, What Does It Mean to Be an
Internationalist?,10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 102 (1989), excerpted in INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY at

103; Anthony D'Amato, What Counts as Law?, in LAWMAKING
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83 (Nicholas G. Onuf ed., 1982), excerpted in INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY at 104. For a brief
discussion of "general principles," at best a distillation of prevailing jurisprudential attitudes
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Resolutions of the United Nations are not a source of law at all; if they were,
the United Nations would be a world legislature. At best, those resolutions
help interpret the prescriptions contained in the U.N. Charter.9
Acknowledging the classic view that customary law and conventions are
the two principal sources of international law, 10 Professor Henkin rules out
conventions as a source of human rights law. If treaties were the source of
human rights norms, then under Professor Henkin's view of treaties they
would only bind the states that signed them (he does not subscribe to the
view that treaties can be a source of custom). The result, in his view of the
matter, would deprive human rights law of its universality-a universality
not only insisted upon by Professor Henkin, but evident from the fact that
no state has made the claim that it, or its regional group, is exempt from
certain basic human rights norms such as the laws prohibiting apartheid,
genocide, slavery, and torture.
By ruling out conventions, Professor Henkin is left with custom. Custom
is, traditionally at least, the only source of international law that yields
universal norms. However, Professor Henkin denies that human rights norms
have their origin in custom. Indeed, Professor Henkin asserts that the
emerging law of human rights "is not based on 'custom,' [is not based] on
state practice at all." 1
Having ruled out both customary and conventional law, Professor Henkin
resolves his dilemma of finding a source for human rights norms by
inventing a new source: "non-conventional" law.
It reminds me of a
bright but difficult child predicting that she will not draw the red ball from
a bag that contains one red ball and one blue ball, reaching in and drawing
out one ball, and then announcing that the ball in her hand is not blue. If
she is asked whether she means that the ball is red she replies, "I didn't say
it was red. All I said is that it was not blue." Perhaps she has invented a

9 Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on
Customary InternationalLaw, 73 PRoc. AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. 301 (1979), excerpted in INT'L
LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 105; Stephen M. Schwebel & Anthony D'Amato,
Contemporary Views on the Sources of InternationalLaw: The Effect of U.N. Resoulations
on Emerging Legal Norms, 73 PRoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 300 (1979), excerpted in INT'L
LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 106; Anthony D'Amato, Israel'sAir Strike Upon the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983), excerpted and adapted in INT'L LAW
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 107.
10Henkin, supra note 2, at 37.
1Id. at 38.
12Id at 37.
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wholly new category, non-blue, but we suspect that her term is simply a
circumlocution for "red." If it is not, she would be obliged to tell us
something about this new category-where it comes from, what it does, how
we can recognize it when we see it, how it is justified. If she refuses to
explain, we shrug our shoulders and simply conclude that she is creating an
unnecessary difficulty with her choice of language. Similarly, when
Professor Henkin tells us that (a) human rights are universal, (b) they are not
conventional, (c) they are not customary, and (d) they are "non-conventional", his "explanation" is suspect.
Of course, if Professor Henkin can endow his new source with recognizable features, then perhaps it is just a code word for those features.
Accordingly, he tells us that "non-conventional law" is itself derived from
"liberal national constitutions" and from "jus cogens." Let us examine these
contentions.
2. Liberal National Constitutions as a Source
The primary new source of human rights law, Professor Henkin tells us,
is based on "contemporary national sources."1 3 It derives "from national
constitutional rights" found in "liberal national constitutions."' 4 The most
basic rights include, in the order in which Professor Henkin mentions them,
the outlawry of apartheid, of genocide, of slavery, of extra-judicial killing or
disappearances, and of torture or inhuman treatment.
Suppose a fair-minded neutral observer accepts Professor Henkin's
statements, but wishes to check for herself the derivation and content of his
list of basic rights. What national constitutions should she consult? If she
were to examine every constitution in the world, she would find that a
majority of them do not provide for these (or other) human rights. What
then? Should she conclude from the non-mention of these rights that they
are not part of international law? Or should she simply exclude the majority
of constitutions (that don't mention these rights) on the ground that they are
not "liberal"? Recall that Professor Henkin used the phrase "liberal national
constitutions." Perhaps Professor Henkin so qualified his new source to
avoid the majority-rule problem. Even so, how can the researcher test
constitutions for liberalism? Are "liberal" constitutions to be defined as only
those which are liberal enough to list the human rights that Professor Henkin

"3Id. at 40.
14Id. at 40.
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is looking for?
Perhaps we can figure out what "liberal national constitutions" Professor
Henkin has in mind by looking at the examples he gives. In a footnote, he
mentions the constitutions of the United States and France. 5 But where,
in those constitutions, does he find a prohibition against apartheid? Or
against genocide? Or against extra-judicial killing or disappearance? Or
against torture or inhuman treatment? These are the most prominent rights
in Professor Henkin's own list of human rights. Even the right against
slavery was not to be found in the original United States Constitution; it took
a civil war and a set of post-civil war amendments to outlaw slavery. Most
constitutions today do not explicitly outlaw slavery, probably because, unlike
pre-civil war United States, they did not have a prior history of it. Most
constitutions likewise do not mention genocide or extra-judicial killing or
disappearances or torture or inhuman treatment. If Professor Henkin's chief
source for human rights law is national constitutions (liberal or otherwise),
why do hardly any of those constitutions mention the human rights on his
list? Is it really credible to claim that human rights law as we know it today
derives from national constitutions? Or even from the sub-category of liberal
national constitutions? Or even from the sub-sub-category of the constitutions of the United States and France?
If Professor Henkin were to argue that all the human rights on his list are
derivable, in the case of the United States Constitution, from the Due Process
Clause (an argument that on its face is plausible), wouldn't that prove too
much? Surely international law does not incorporate all the constitutional
decisions explicating the Due Process Clause, all the nuances of American
civil and criminal procedure associated with that clause, the long and
complex historical explication of "substantive due process," and all the other
paraphernalia associated with that umbrella clause in American constitutional
law. And if international law did include all these things, does it also
include all the explications and nuances of clauses similar to the Due Process
Clause found in other national constitutions?
If Professor Henkin in fact cannot locate the human rights on his list in
"liberal national constitutions," could he argue that they would be in those
constitutions if those constitutions were appropriately amended to include
them? This would of course be a gigantic bootstrap argument. But, if we
for the moment concede the bootstrap, we still are not told how we get from
constitutional law to international law. National constitutions are simply a
5 Id. at 40 n.34.
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source of national law and not a source of international law.'6 If that were
not true, foreign constitutions could be cited by American litigants in
American courts as overruling contrary principles in the United States
Constitution. Consider, for example, the two national issues debated in the
United States Congress in 1994: gun control and health care. Does
Professor Henkin believe that if a considerable number of liberal national
constitutions in the world today provided for gun control, such a provision
would spring into international law and serve to override the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution? Or if a majority of foreign
constitutions provided for universal health care for their citizens, would
Professor Henkin say that there would be no need for a health-care debate
in the Congress of the United States because Americans would automatically
be entitled to health care as a matter of international law? Surely one cannot
persuasively claim that what other countries provide in their national
constitutions affect the rights of non-nationals under international law. If
such a claim were true, then any nation could change international law
simply by amending its own constitution. If brief, national constitutions
simply are not, and have never been, sources of international law. It is
rather astounding that Professor Henkin wants to elevate them to the status
of sources of international law in order to "explain" what he means by "nonconventional" law.
Perhaps it can be argued on behalf of Professor Henkin that he is only
talking about deriving the idea of human rights, and not the international law
of human rights, from national constitutions. His essay perhaps should be
read as a contemporaneous account of the sentiment of human rights and not
the law of human rights. Indeed, if we were to go through his essay and
substitute the word "sentiment" each time we see the word "law," some of
his contentions would become persuasive. We would learn that the sentiment
of human rights is on the increase throughout the world, that it is harder and
harder for governments to oppose that sentiment, and that more and more
people think that human rights are good things. But his essay takes a wrong
turn when he attributes this sentiment of human rights to "liberal national
constitutions." Such a thesis, as confined just to the sentiment of human
rights (not to mention the law of human rights), vastly understates the readily
available evidence. A careful study of the history of the idea of human
rights by Burns Weston lists numerous fundamental sources of the idea of

16See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

406 (1952), and infra note 27.
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human rights, only a minor one of which is national constitutions.17 It
would appear that Professor Henkin, who is surely aware of the history
recounted by Professor Weston, has settled on national constitutions (instead
of the intellectual history of the past thirty centuries) as the source for the
international law of human rights because he would like his readers to
believe that he is talking about law and not about sentiment. There appears
to be something "legal" about national constitutions that is missing from
other documents such as the doctrines of the Greek stoics, the essays of the
Philosophes, the writings of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and all the
other sources cited by Professor Weston. It would not do to argue that
human rights are part of international law because John Locke or John
Milton or John Stuart Mill said so. But, it might do (if readers aren't paying
close attention) to say that human rights are part of international law because
it is so provided in liberal national constitutions. A constitution is a "law"
and international law is "law" so maybe no one will notice that it takes
sleight-of-hand to move from one to the other.
What Professor Henkin has done is to invent a new source of international
law-namely, provisions in liberal national constitutions-to explain where
human rights law comes from. But since national constitutions are not a
source of international law, invoking them is hardly explanatory of the
content of international law. His "explanation" is far more controversial than
the thing explained. Our desire to know where human rights law comes
from is hardly satisfied by the assertion that it is derived from "liberal
national constitutions" when those constitutions themselves are clearly not
a source of international law.
3. Jus Cogens as a Source
Professor Henkin offers a second "source" for human rights law:
Conceptually, it [human rights law] may have sneaked into
the law [international
law] on the back of another idea, "ius
18
cogens."

'7 Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrFrANICA, excerpted in INT'L LAW
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 21.

"SHenkin, supra note 2, at 38. Throughout his essay, Professor Henkin places key terms

in quotation marks, such as "non-conventional" law and "jus cogens, .... custom," and
"intervention." Since he is not quoting anyone, the use of quotation marks appears to be a
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Despite the fact that jus cogens performed this difficult feat so stealthily that
no one other than Professor Henkin seems to have noticed it, the fundamental objection to Professor Henkin's theory is that jus cogens is itself, at best,
a meta-norm and not a source of norms.' 9 I say "at best" advisedly,
because in fact no one knows where jus cogens comes from, no one knows
whether or how or why it is part of international law, no one knows its
content, no one knows how to modify it once it is articulated, and indeed no
one knows whether it even exists (although it is certainly talked about a
lot).2° The strangeness of Professor Henkin's "non-conventional law"
source of human rights is not "explained" by invoking the even stranger
notion of jus cogens. It's almost like saying that the source of Hurricane
Edna now ravaging New Jersey was a computer error by a meteorologist on
Channel Seven.2
B. The Arbitrarinessof Professor Henkin's "Sources"
From time immemorial, rules of law have been recognized as being
capable of objective identification and verification. The opposing parties in
any case or controversy have, in principle, equal opportunity to read the
same materials and to argue the content of the law to a judge or tribunal.
The judge, in turn, has the opportunity of looking up the sources to doublecheck counsel. If the plaintiff's attorney claims that X is the applicable rule
of law in the case, she will either cite a statute (or other regulation) in the
jurisdiction, or argue that X represents the best "fit" in the most closely
analogous case law. She will cite the cases she relies upon, so that her
opponent may read the same cases and have the opportunity to deny that X
is the rule of decision in those cases. Her opponent may also bring up other
cases and other statutes, which she in turn will have the opportunity to read.

stylistic device designed to sneer at the terms quoted, as if to say that he does not take all this
stuff seriously and neither should we.
'9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64, openedfor signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
" See Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L.
1 (1990). excerpted in INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 116. Article 64 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says a peremptory norm (jus cogens) can be
superseded by a norm of the same character, but the Convention does not inform us where
the superseding norm comes from.
2' Leading to the irresistible follow-up: the hurricane caused twenty million dollars worth
of improvements.
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The court will then consider the statutes and cases cited by the parties in
deciding whether X is the applicable rule of law in the case. The "law," in
short, is something objective. Only objectively verifiable law has any chance
of guiding a judge (or other decision-maker) away from arbitrary decisionmaking.'
But when we consider Professor Henkin's keynote address, we find no
basis for objectively determining and verifying any of the human rights on
his list. Although we might agree with the items he chose, the list itself is
arbitrary. We cannot know for sure, on the basis of the "sources" Professor
Henkin has given, whether any particular right belongs on the list. We
cannot know why Professor Henkin included some rights and excluded
others. The arbitrariness of his approach may be evidenced by the fact that
he has recently changed his mind about the most important human right on
his list. In his contribution to a book published five years ago, he attacked
humanitarian intervention on the ground that "the use of force remains itself
a most serious--the most serious-violation of human rights."' But today,
that "most serious" violation of human rights is conspicuously absent from
his list.
Not only is it absent, but in fact Professor Henkin now seems to approve
of the use of force. In his keynote address he approves of the fact that the
"international system... has sometimes encouraged states to 'intervene' in
other states in support of human rights."' Of course, Professor Henkin is
entitled to change his mind.'
He was entitled to argue in 1989 that
forcible intervention was the most serious violation of human rights, and
entitled also to so thoroughly change his mind in 1994 that the same
violation does not even make his list. But if Professor Henkin changes his
mind, that's something quite different from the entire international legal
system changing its mind. It is clear that ifX was the "most serious" human
rights violation five years ago, the world hasn't changed so much that today
X doesn't even make a list of principal human rights violations. We simply
cannot imagine the nations of the world undergoing such a radical change
" I've hedged this sentence to reflect a lengthy exposition of the matter. See Anthony
D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148 (1990).
' Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT v. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 61 (Council on Foreign Relations 1989).

4Henkin, supra note 2, at 33.
2 I might fantasize that a book review I wrote had something to do with his change of
mind. See Anthony D'Amato, Review ofMight v. Right, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 201 (1991) (book
review).
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in just five years. Instead, the only logical conclusions are either that
Professor Henkin was right in 1989 and is wrong in 1994, or was wrong in
1989 and is right today, or that his "source," like tea leaves that only he can
interpret, yields whatever norms he likes.
I believe Professor Henkin has undermined his own cause by his talk
about "non-conventional" law. I am sure that he is sincerely, even
passionately, committed to the proposition that the human rights on his list
are part of universally binding international law. He believes in the primacy
of the individual. He believes that people have basic rights and that these
rights can be asserted against states. He believes that national and international courts can and should enforce these rights as a matter of law. Yet by
failing to provide those courts with any objectively determinable basis for
identifying and verifying as part of international law any of the rights on his
list, Professor Henkin has ended up debasing the very rights he wants to
elevate above all norms.
Yet the story is not quite complete by alleging that Professor Henkin has
"failed" to provide us with a source for human rights in international law.
It is not simply that he has failed; the problem goes a lot deeper. Within his
world view, he cannot provide us with a source for human rights law. As
I shall now proceed to argue, the Sovereignty Paradigm that rules his
thinking disables him from providing a determinable and verifiable source.
C. The Sovereignty Concept in InternationalLaw
Professor Henkin rightly spent the opening part of his keynote address on
the subject of sovereignty. It is the key to the question of "where he is
coming from." In order to locate his Sovereignty Paradigm within the
various versions of sovereignty in international law, let us consider six
permutations of "sovereignty," the sixth of which I will call the Sovereignty
Paradigm:
1. The most extreme version of sovereignty could be called strict national
sovereignty. In this view, nations are sovereign over international law.
Therefore, international law exists only to the extent that each nation decides
to obey it. Even if a nation has decided to obey a rule of international law,
it may change its mind at any time, and if it changes its mind, the rule loses
its force against that nation.
This strict view of sovereignty is simply a cumbersome way of saying that
international law is not "law." It is not "law" because nations are entitled
(by virtue of the sovereignty theory) to disobey it at will. For the person
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who believes that international law is really law, 26 strict national sovereignty makes no sense.
2. A sibling of the strict sovereignty view is the theory known as
Dualism. Dualists believe that international law and national law are two
separate, independent legal orders, each valid in its own sphere. National
law governs the "internal" or "domestic" affairs of a state, while international
law governs its "foreign" affairs.'
If dualism were a correct theory of international law, internal affairs would
be fixed for all time as purely internal. Anything within a state's domestic
jurisdiction would have to remain within a state's domestic jurisdiction,
forever impervious to international legal regulation. For under the dualist
theory, both international law and domestic law would be powerless to
transform domestic subject-matter into international subject-matter; neither
of these legal regimes has any "jurisdiction" over the other. But if we all
accept the fact that genocide moved from a purely internal matter prior to
1939 to an international matter after 1945, then dualism cannot describe the
new status of the prohibition against genocide. Prior to 1939, what a
government did to its own citizens within its own territory-including mass
murder-was purely within its internal law, its "domestic jurisdiction." If
dualism were a correct theory then nothing that transpired since 1939 could
6 See Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293
(1984), excerpted in INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 37.
Consider Hans Kelsen's classic critique of dualism:
Every so-called domestic affair of a state can be made the subject matter
of an international agreement and so be transformed into a foreign affair
....
If we discard the spatial metaphor, we thus find that the attempted
distinction between the subject matters of national and international law
is mere tautology. The so-called "domestic affairs" of a state are, by
definition, those which are regulated by the national law: the "foreign
affairs" are, by definition, those which are regulated by international law.
The assertion that national law regulates domestic affairs, and international law foreign affairs, boils down to the truism that national law regulates
what is regulated by national law, international law what is regulated by
international law.

Still there remains a certain truth in the statement that international law
is "interstate" law, whereas national law is, so to speak, one-state law.
But, as pointed out, this differentiation does not concern the subject
matter, it concerns the creation of international and national law.
Whereas national law is created by acts of one state alone .... international law is usually created by the cooperation of two or several states.
KELSEN, supra note 16, at 405-06.
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transform domestic mass murder into an international crime. Since we now
routinely say that a government is prohibited by international law from
committing genocide against its own citizens within its own territory, we
must discard the theory of dualism.'
3. Dualism, as we have seen, involves a division of subject matter
between the internal and the international. A variant on dualism involves a
division of the two main sources of international law. Advocates of this
position, such as Grigori Tunkin or Phillip Trimble, say that treaties are
binding on signatory states, but customary law is only binding to the extent
that any state wishes to recognize it.29
The variant on dualism is subject to the same objection as the preceding
one: that the division is artificial, and crumbles over time. For example,
states negotiate treaties against a customary law background. They know
when a provision deviates from the customary rule, and the extent of the
deviation figures into the negotiation process. Moreover, states know that
the words in the treaty incorporate customary-law meanings that have
evolved over centuries, and if they wish to depart from the standard
meaning, they must make it explicit in the treaty. Thus, it would be artificial
and distorting in the extreme to interpret treaties as if the customary-law
context did not exist. Yet dualists, by disavowing customary law, are forced
into arguing that each state party to a treaty must apply its own internal law
to the interpretation of the treaty. Resort to the separate legal systems of the
parties for interpretation of a common document is a recipe for aggravating,
not solving, international disputes. 0 More importantly, it misunderstands
the way international courts and international organizations deal with
questions of treaty interpretation.

2 Additionally, as we will see below, dualism would be unable to account for the rise of
many rules of customary international law that even dualists today concede are part of
international law, such as the rule that a state may not deny justice to an alien within its
territory.
29 See generally, DEBATE:

The "Domestication" of InternationalLaw, in INT'L LAW

ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 400-10.
" See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). By ignoring
international customary law, the majority opinion reached a result that was counterproductive
and costly for the international interests that the court's majority thought it was acting to
preserve. See Jacques MacChesney & Anthony D'Amato, Facts of the Alvarez Case, INT'L
LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 246; Malvina Halberstam & Anthony D'Amato, DEBATE:
Abduction Does Not Violate the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY,

supra note 8, at 248-54.
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Also applicable here is the objection I made above about genocide. Under
the "treaty only" variant of dualism, any nation today is free under
international law to commit genocide against its own population within its
own territory unless it has ratified the Genocide Convention. So, the United
States was free to commit genocide prior to 1989, the year it belatedly
ratified the Genocide Convention. If these propositions strike you as
outrageous, then you should reject the "treaty-only" variant of dualism.
4. A different notion of sovereignty is that some states, but not all, are
sovereign over international law. One variant on this view is that some
states have greater law-creating power than other states. Among the few
people who have asserted this position are Charles DeVisscher, who said that
the major powers carry more weight in the formation of international
custom, 31 and Myres McDougal who said that General Assembly resolutions are binding if accepted by the major powers. 2
This position has been thoroughly discredited on the ground not only that
it contradicts the rule of equality of states under international law, but also
because it neither offers any persuasive reason to the minor powers why they
should obey the rules of international law nor explains why they do obey
33

it.

5. A related view is that some states have sovereignty over international
law in the sense that they are exempt from some or all of its rules. This
position has been taken by the Ayatollah Khomeni and by Professor
McDougal, both invoking a higher morality which when followed allows a
nation to depart from international rules that are binding on other nations.
Khomeni derives his binding moral precepts from Allah; McDougal derives
his from Harold Lasswell. 34

31 CHARLES DEVISscHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBIUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 149

(P.E. Corbett trans., 2d ed. 1968).
32 Myres McDougal, Remarks at the Panel on Contemporary Views on the Sources of
InternationalLaw, 73 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 327-32 (1979).
33 Of course, in practice, some states succeed in playing a bigger role in the formation of
international law than other states. Not every state exerts itself to the same extent. See
generally ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT Op CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-66

(1971).
' In his famous essay on hydrogen bomb testing, Professor McDougal argued that the
United States would not, but the Soviet Union would, be violating international law by
engaging in such testing, on the ground that only the United States, as between the two
superpowers, exemplifies the Lasswellian free-world virtues. For the position of Professors
McDougal and Schlei and my critique of it, see DEBATE: Custom As Reasonableness,INT'L
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This variant is subject to the same objections as the previous one. It
contradicts the rule of equality of states which is the foundation of
international law. And, if some states are "above" international law, why
should the states who are "below" it obey it?
Incidentally, I do not think that the curious notion of the "persistent
objector" is an instance of any of these variants on sovereignty. Supporters
of the "persistent objector" thesis (which include Professor Henkin 35) do not
claim that any particular state is above international law. They only claim
that any state which meets certain criteria for the status of persistent objector
is able to carve out an exception for itself from the particular rule of
customary law to which it has persistently objected.'
6. We arrive finally at the Sovereignty Paradigm. 37 It has the following
characteristics, according to Professor Henkin:
-that the state system is committed exclusively to state
values, principally to state autonomy and the impermeability
of state territory, and to the welfare of the state as a monolithic entity;
-that international law is based on the consent of states,
and is made only by states and only for states;
-that the international system and international law do not

LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 89-94.
33 See Henkin, supra note 2, at 38, 44.
36 See The Persistent Objector: DEBATE, INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 110-

15 (excerpting Jonathon I. Charney, The PersistantObjector Rule and the Development of
Customary International Law, 56 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1986) and Ted L. Stein, The
Approach of the Diffirent Drummer: The Principleof the PersistentObjector in International
Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985)). My own view is that a state cannot exempt itself
from a customary rule in formation by announcing that it will not be bound by it, any more
than I can announce that I will not be bound by new case law in an emerging field of law in
the United States on the ground that I was not one of the parties to the case and I object to
the court's decision.
37 The Sovereignty Paradigm as characterized by Professor Henkin has sometimes been

referred to as "domestic jurisdiction." See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Domestic Jurisdiction,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1090-96 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed. 1992). The term
"domestic jurisdiction" could be logically harmless, meaning essentially, that everything not
controlled by international law is reserved to the domestic jurisdiction of each state. But
psychologically, those who invoke the term mean more than that. They look upon
international law as an invader of domestic jurisdiction, as an unwelcome foreign influence.
Domestic jurisdiction is primary; international legal obligations are secondary.
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(may not) address what goes on within a state; in particular,
how a state treats its own inhabitants is no one else's
business, not the business of the system, not the business of
any other state;
---that a state may concern itself with what goes on inside
another state only as that impinges on its own state interests.
(Therefore, a state may presume to afford "diplomatic
protection" to its diplomats or its nationals, not to other
human beings.)3"
Of course, on the level of strict logic, the idea of human rights is
incompatible with the Sovereignty Paradigm. Human rights are universal
rights; they are rights against every nation in the world including one's own
nation. Professor Henkin is well aware of this logical incompatibility. He
argues that human rights norms have made inroads upon the Sovereignty
Paradigm. He states that human rights have become "international law"
through a process of radical derogation from the traditional sovereign
prerogatives of states.39 His is a sort of Swiss Cheese view of sovereignty:
there's plenty of cheese, but there are holes in it (for human rights).
Unlike the other five variants on sovereignty, the Sovereignty Paradigm
is rooted in psychology. It is closest in form to the second of the variants
I discussed above (dualism), but rather than insisting that internal affairs are
impervious to international law, it takes the position that internal affairs are
strongly presumed to be a matter for the individual nation and that this
presumption may only be rebutted by a powerful showing that a particular
norm of international law has penetrated the domestic-jurisdiction barrier.
The Sovereignty Paradigm is important because psychology can be more
powerful than logic.
In the above quotation from Professor Henkin's address, note the use of
the key term "derogation." 4 Human rights, in his view, are derogations

38 Henkin, supra note 2, at 32. In addition, Professor Henkin lists two other "assumptions." Ma.
"9Id. at 32-33.
40 He again uses it later in his address: "In recent years, international concern for human
rights has led to even more 'intrusive enforcement,' more stringent derogations from
sovereignty.' " It at 43. The pervasive use of quotation marks around key terms in
Professor Henkin's essay seems to be used as a device to cast some doubt on the very
language he employs, as I suggested above, supra note 18, or to undercut his own constructs,
or to present a fuzzy picture to the reader. This may be evidence of Professor Henkin's lack
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from sovereignty. (It's as if we really don't want holes in our Swiss Cheese,
but we put up with them.) Anyone familiar with the development of the
common law understands the psychological power of the concept of
derogation. From the eleventh century to the seventeenth, the English
common law courts regarded acts of Parliament as derogations from the
common law. From a strictly logical, as opposed to psychological, point of
view, it wouldn't matter whether statutes are derogations from common law
or common law is a derogation from statutory law. But psychologically, the
courts' idea that statutes are derogations from common law led them to
construe statutes "strictly"-to grudgingly allow statutes to control a case if
the statutory language was clear and the case clearly fell within its terms, but
otherwise to decide the case on common-law grounds. Statutes were given
very little breathing room. Indeed, in many cases courts found some way or
other to construe a statute so that it did not strictly apply to the case at hand,
and then proceeded to ignore the statute.
This attitude persisted into the eighteenth century when finally Jeremy
Bentham turned the situation around by coming up with a replacement
paradigm. Bentham contended that statutes were the primary sources of law
(law is a "command" of the sovereign), and that they should be broadly
construed so as to control as many cases as possible. Bentham's Positivist
Paradigm succeeded in replacing the reigning Common Law Paradigm. The
resulting interchange of power between parliament and judiciary was
immense, and has persisted to the present day.
Professor Henkin and others who are immersed in the Sovereignty
Paradigm will grudgingly allow some human rights norms to creep under the
sovereignty tent. The norms are admitted as "exceptions" to sovereignty, as
"derogations" from sovereignty. As with all derogations from a norm, the
burden of proof falls upon human rights. Even though as a matter of
personal preference Professor Henkin might like to see an increasing
acceptance of human rights in international law, the very foundation he
stands upon presents a psychological barrier against the spread and
penetration of those rights.4 1

of conviction in his own essay. It may indicate, in short, that he realizes that the "source"
he is invoking makes no logical sense and that the "sovereignty" he clings to is an atavism.

"' His basic view seems akin to the way I once described the nineteenth century view that
a state might have of its own jurisdiction: "Everything that goes on within our borders is our
business and international law only applies to those times when we bump up against other
units. We bump up against them on the high seas or when there's a war or at a few other
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Because I am talking about psychological attitudes here, permit me a
personal observation: nearly all American international lawyers I know who
once served in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
or on the legal staff of the Pentagon, or in the Foreign Service, seem to be
among the strongest adherents to the Sovereignty Paradigm. Somehow,
governmental service seems to convince American lawyers, day after day, to
become suspicious of, if not hostile to, "international law" as a sneaky
attempt by pipsqueak nations to bulldoze the United States into doing
something contrary to our policy or national interest. This kind of hubris,
I think, comes from an exalted sense of personal power derived from
working for the most powerful government on earth.
In the foreign offices of lesser powers, lawyers might attain the perspective that Georges Scelle called "dedoublement fonctionnel"-by making
claims and alternatively passing on the claims of others, one develops an
international perspective. But maybe this largeness of attitude noticed by
Scelle only works when one's nation needs international law as much as it
fears it.
In the United States, at least so far, there is a prevalent feeling among our
governmental officials and the lawyers who work in government departments
such as the Pentagon and the State Department that international law is only
a tool to be used in the national interest, and not something that we should
allow to give any advantage in any case to a militarily inferior nation. Our
governmental and ex-governmental lawyers fear international law more than
they use it; they fear its use by other nations against us, and they don't use
it too much themselves because they have other ways-withholding aid,
using economic muscle, threatening the use of force-to get what they want.
I do not claim that all governmental and ex-governmental lawyers have this
attitude or display it all of the time, nor that they don't from time to time
take positions totally contrary to prevailing United States policy. I am only
saying that they seem intellectually to come from within the Sovereignty
Paradigm, and that it colors everything they think about international law,
including the international law of human rights.
We must assume that Professor Henkin is well aware of the Sovereignty
Paradigm within which he works and that he knows it places a psychological
barrier against human rights. Despite a keynote address that impassionately

times. But our boundaries carve out a certain territory that's our own and doesn't affect other
territories." Anthony D'Amato, A Seminar on Custom, INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note
8, at 74.
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welcomes the arrival of human rights law, he appears to have an even
stronger conviction that international norms of human rights should not be
binding as law upon the United States. His closing words reveal his true
position:
We, too, have to accept international standards, the expression of the contemporary moral intuition, when they are
higher than ours, e.g., to outlaw capital punishment for
juvenile crimes, or to protect against inhuman or degrading
treatment. We have to pay a decent respect to the opinions
of mankind by submitting to international scrutiny (e.g., by
the Human Rights Committee, pursuant to the Protocol), to
the International Court of Justice, to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. We, too, exercising our sovereignty, must consent to be governed and help achieve good
international governance for living in a decent world.42
When Professor Henkin says "we have to," he means "we ought to." He is
not saying that we are compelled by law, he is saying that we ought to
choose to accept external norms. We must "consent to be governed," he
says in his last sentence, emphasizing the fact that unless we consent we are
not, in his view, governed by these international norms. In short, as much
as Professor Henkin himself may deplore capital punishment for juvenile
offenders, for example, he is unwilling to concede to the international
community any legal power to make that prohibition effective within the
United States. Psychologically, he is still a dualist; international law cannot
tell the United States government what to do internally, unless the government consents to particular norms. (Thus, it would have been perfectly legal
under international law for the United States government to have committed
genocide prior to 1989, if I correctly interpret what Professor Henkin is
really saying.)
Professor Henkin's keynote address is an exercise in sociology, not law.
Clinging to the Sovereignty Paradigm, he describes the world's increasing
receptivity toward human rights and adjures the United States to consent to
a longer list of norms, but can never bring himself to say that the
norms--except for a few generally stated and uncontroversial ones such as
those involving genocide, apartheid, slavery, and torture-are legally binding

42

Henkin, supra note 2, at 45.
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on the United States. In the final reckoning, Professor Henkin chooses
sovereignty over human rights. As much as he believes in the cause of
human rights, he believes even more in the right of the United States to
decide its own policies without interference from international norms that
have developed outside the United States. Like many of the present Justices
of the Supreme Court, Professor Henkin will not allow foreign nations to lay
down the law for us. No matter how strong the human rights norm against
capital punishment of juveniles may develop in foreign nations, the adherents
to the Sovereignty Paradigm do not want to constrain the right of states
within the United States or the federal government to execute juveniles
convicted of certain crimes. Nor are they in a position to "make an
exception" for a norm like the one against capital punishment of juveniles:
they are afraid of opening a wedge for future norms that they might not like,
and in any event they lack a coherent theoretical basis for determining the
content of international human rights. This unwillingness to open the U.S.
door to foreign norms may be why Professor Henkin lists only the safest,
vaguest, and most uncontroversial norms as having attained international-law
status.
To be sure, if Professor Henkin's address together with all his previous
writings show that sovereignty is more important to him than human rights,
he is entitled to his preference, but we are also entitled to "know where he
is coming from." We are entitled, that is, to take his denunciation of the
"shibboleth of 'sovereignty' "3 with a grain of salt, knowing that to
Professor Henkin sovereignty turns out to be much more than a shibboleth.
We are entitled to take his assertion that "an occasional state cannot veto law
that reflects the contemporary international political-moral intuition" as
still leaving an escape hatch for the United States when a norm arises that
the United States doesn't like: either because the United States is not a mere
"occasional state" in Professor Henkin's view, or because, if the crunch
comes, Professor Henkin will be available to announce that the unwanted
norm does not reflect the contemporary international "political-moral
intuition." In short, his statement is a recipe for auto-interpretation of human
rights norms.
The Sovereignty Paradigm, like all the other variants on the theme of
sovereignty, is foundationally incompatible with the idea of human rights.
In a major recent development, thirty-seven states participating in the

at 43.
d at 44.

3 Id.
44
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Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe explicitly recognized this
incompatibility, and charted in the Moscow Document a new approach to
human rights:
The participating States emphasize that issues relating to
human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the
rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these
rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the
international order. They categorically and irrevocable
declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the
human dimension of the Conference on Security and
Participation in Europe are matters of direct and legitimate
concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the States concerned.'
Those who cling to the Sovereignty Paradigm while urging the incorporation of human rights into international law are somewhat like the tobacco
company executive who offers to lead an anti-smoking campaign. We have
every right to wonder whether the executive is leading the campaign
because: (a) it gives him some degree of control over it, (b) the campaign
will take place regardless of whether he leads it, and (c) if someone not
connected to the tobacco industry winds up leading the campaign it might
turn out to be a resounding success. Similarly, when a leading international
scholar whom we have every reason to believe is utterly sincere in his
dedication to human rights is "coming from" the Sovereignty Paradigm, we
have good reason to doubt either the underpinnings of his apparent
dedication, or, at least, the effectiveness of his presentation.

5 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Moscow
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Moscow, Oct. 3, 1991, reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 160, 1672
(1992) [hereinafter Moscow Document]. The participating states are Albania, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.
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III. TOWARD A NEuTRAL PARADIGM
A. Retaining States as Subjects of InternationalLaw
There is a rejoinder that Professor Henkin could make at this point in my
essay, should he wish to make it. He would be entitled to say that his
attitude toward human rights is and should be irrelevant to his scholarly
opinion about the sources of international law. If he concludes on the basis
of scholarly research that the source of human rights law is "non-conventional" (whatever that means), that it is not based on the practice of states
(whatever that seems to say), and that it is a derogation from sovereignty
(even if he says sovereignty is a shibboleth), he is entitled to call these
things as he sees them. He is right in resisting any temptation to change his
analysis of the sources of human rights law simply because he desires to
promote the cause of human rights.
Naturally I would agree with this rejoinder if Professor Henkin wished to
make it. I concede that it is possible for people to believe simultaneously
in the Sovereignty Paradigm and in the international law of human rights,
and if they do, their cognitive dissonance is a private problem for them,
having nothing to do with the objective soundness of either the Sovereignty
Paradigm or the international law of human rights taken separately. As
much as I would personally like to see people resolve this inner contradiction
by deciding either that their Sovereignty Paradigm prevents them from full
espousal of the cause of human rights in international law (and then refrain
from leading the human rights parade), or that their eagerness to see human
rights expand to the limits of its logic requires them to discard the Sovereignty Paradigm like a child who eventually grows up and discards a security
blanket, they have every right to accept both principles simultaneously and
live with the ensuing cognitive dissonance. Paradigms are well-nigh
impossible to dislodge from one's mind. But everyone else is entitled to
avoid cognitive dissonance if they are not wedded to the Sovereignty
Paradigm and would accept the possibility of a replacement paradigm.
I want to suggest a replacement paradigm, bearing in mind Professor
Henkin's admonition that "[liaw professors are a conservative lot. We teach
what we were taught, and what we have long taught."
Just suggesting a
replacement paradigm for the Sovereignty Paradigm obviously will not
change the minds of conservative legal scholars. Perhaps strategic consider-

46

Henkin, supra note 2, at 43.
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ation should play a role in choosing a replacement paradigm. There are two
replacements that I have considered: a Neutral Paradigm and a Human
Rights Paradigm. If I were to follow the tactical lead of that immensely
successful publicist Jeremy Bentham, I would opt for a Human Rights
Paradigm. Bentham knew how to shake up the conservative legal establishment. Faced with a prevailing paradigm that amounted essentially to a
dictatorship of the common law, he replaced it with a paradigm that
amounted to a dictatorship of statutory law. By going from one extreme to
the other, he made his point more effectively than if he had gone only halfway. By choosing the extreme of a Positivist Paradigm, he was more
effective in the real world than if he had chosen a Neutral Paradigm (one
that regarded the common law and statutory law on equal terms.)47
In the Benthamite tradition, a radical Human Rights Paradigm, as a
corrective to the Sovereignty Paradigm, would take the world-view that only
persons, and not nations, count in international law. Nations are simply
aggregates of persons, but they are not "entities" entitled to separate
consideration."
Perhaps adherents of this viewpoint should relabel
international law "interpersonal law." In their favor is a long and sorry
history of reification of national entities: the bloody wars of nationalism in
the nineteenth century (reviving today in Yugoslavia and parts of Africa), the
deification of the State in Hegelian philosophy (laying a theoretical
foundation for Hitler's Germany and the ensuing world war and holocaust),
and the general degradation of the individual as nothing more than a servant
of the state.
Even though the Human Rights Paradigm would be an example of
Benthamite strategy, I leave it to someone else to advocate it. My view of
today's world convinces me that states are here to stay; they are not about
to become subordinated to individuals. We may see in the near future a
gradual movement toward world federalism on the current European model,
but even if there is such a movement, states as components in a federal
system will retain many of their competencies. The government of a world
federalism will most likely be a government of limited powers. International

' Although Bentham may have made the right strategic choice, his Positivist Paradigm
has always seemed to me to be an impoverished view of law, despite the efforts of Hans
Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart to keep it alive. For my criticisms, see ANTHONY D'AMATO,
JURISPRUDENCE: A DEsCRPT"IVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIs OF THE LAW (1984).
8 See FERNANDO TESON, HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALrrY (1988).
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law as we know it would still have a huge role to play within a world
federalism.
But more important than any prediction about these matters is a theoretical
reason that for me supports the role of states as subjects of international law
at least for the foreseeable future: A state is more than a single representative of the totality of individuals within it; a state embodies the relations
among those individuals4 9 as well as all their relations to the territory they
inhabit. Moreover, a state embodies the relations of persons living at the
moment to their ancestors and to their future offspring. A state, therefore,
captures a vast and intricate web of personal and territorial relationships
extending into the past and into the future. 5° A state is therefore a different
and rather special kind of "player" in the international system." If we
dispensed (theoretically) with international law and replaced it with
interpersonal law, many of the important relational values embodied in the
state would be lost.5 2

9 If one were to add up all the relations between all the individuals in the state, the
resulting number would be staggeringly higher than the population total.
" Elsewhere I have called the state a "translucent" entity, to distinguish it from
transparent (the equivalent of a Human Rights Paradigm) or opaque (the equivalent of a
Sovereignty Paradigm). See Anthony D'Amato, The Relation of the Individual to the State
in the Era of Human Rights, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1989), excerpted in INT'L LAW
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 168.
' Mathematicians will recognize a parallel here to set theory: the totality of relations
among members of a set creates a set of a higher order.
52 Vattel put it this way:
The universal society of the human race being an institution of nature
herself, that is to say, a necessary consequence of the nature of man,-all
men in whatever stations they are placed, are bound to cultivate it, and
to discharge its duties. They cannot liberate themselves from the
obligation by any convention, by any private association. When,
therefore, they unite in civil society for the purpose of forming a separate
state or nation, they may indeed enter into particular engagements towards
those with whom they associate themselves; but they remain still bound
to the performance of their duties towards the rest of mankind All the
difference consists in this, that having agreed to act in common, and
having resigned their rights and submitted their will to the body of the
society, in every thing that concerns their common welfare, it thenceforward belongs to that body, that state, and its rulers, to fulfil [sic] the
duties of humanity towards strangers in every thing that no longer
depends on the liberty of individuals; and it is the state more particularly
that is to perform those duties towards other states.
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I suggest, therefore, that the Sovereignty Paradigm be replaced with a
Neutral Paradigm, one that accepts both persons and states as subjects of
international law without creating a presumption against either persons or
states. In contrast to the Sovereignty Paradigm which represents a psychological barrier against the emergence and spread of human rights norms, the
Neutral Paradigm would neither resist nor encourage those norms. Human
rights norms would emerge in the international legal system law the same
way any other norms emerge. They would have no special status, but they
would also have no inferior status.
But, if human rights norms are like any other norms, we face a big
conceptual hurdle. Traditional norms of international law (for example,
norms relating to the law of the sea, or norms of diplomatic immunity, or the
laws of war, or any other traditional subject-matter of international law),
arise through the workings of custom. If the Neutral Paradigm calls for
treating emerging human rights norms on the same footing as traditional
norms, then an explanation is needed for the emergence of human rights
norms via the practice of states. The Sovereignty Paradigm as described by
Professor Henkin specifically denies that human-rights norms arise through
the practice of states.
To recapitulate the argument:
(1) Custom is the only universal international law (my view).
(2) Human rights do not derive from custom (Professor Henkin's
view).
(3) At least some human rights norms are part of universal
international law (Professor Henkin and I share this view.)
(4) Therefore, one of the above propositions is false. Either (1) is
false, and human rights have somehow been established as a wholly
new and different form of universal international law (this is
Professor Henkin's position-he calls it "non-conventional law"), or
(2) is false (this is the position I want to defend).

VAirEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, Intro., § 11, at Ix-Ixi (Chitty trans.
1852).

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 25:47

B. The Problem of State Practice
A paradigm actually tells us what we see in the real world. 3 Thomas
Kuhn gives numerous examples, among which is the fact that Western
astronomers, who were gripped by the Ptolemaic paradigm that the stars in
the immutable heavens were fixed in place, first saw change in the motion
of stars in the half-century after Copernicus' new paradigm was proposed.
In contrast, "the Chinese, whose cosmological beliefs did not preclude
celestial change, had recorded the appearance of many new stars in the
heavens at a much earlier date."'
When experiments are performed that
conflict with the reigning paradigm in a field of science, the experimental
result is either deemed an anomaly or is shrugged off as "measurement
error." Eventually, if the anomalies pile up, there is a crisis in the field
which is resolvable only by the substitution of an entirely new paradigm.
Even then, the scientists who in their formative years absorbed the reigning
paradigm, used it in their published research and taught it to their students,
are likely in most cases to resist the new paradigm and to maintain their own
view for their lifetime.
I suggest that the Sovereignty Paradigm does not allow its adherents to see
certain aspects of the practice of states. They are blind to the rise of human
rights norms in customary law because it does not fit their paradigm. When
Professor Henkin asserts that the emerging law of human rights "is not based
on 'custom,' is not based on state practice at all,"5 5 he is asserting a belief
based on what he actually sees. He cannot see the state practice in question
because he clings to a paradigm that won't allow him to see it.
In order to see the state practice that is hidden from the view of adherents
to the Sovereignty Paradigm, we need to look at the two major components
of state practice. The first is the interest and concern of the reacting state
in the act committed by the acting state. The second is the interactionof the
reacting and the acting states. I am talking about any act at all-whether it
falls within the category of human rights, or mining initiatives on the ocean
floor, or setting up an embargo, or emitting pollutants into the international
environment. For any of these acts to be "noticed" by the international legal

53 Einstein said (somewhere) that one only sees what one's theory allows one to see. If
a scientist is blind to evidence that contradicts her theory, it is because she only sees what she
wants to see.
54 KUHN, supra note 7, at 115.
55 Henkin, supra note 2, at 38.
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community and begin to form part of the state practice that leads to
customary law, they must be within the interest and concern of the reacting
state and they must then form part of an interaction between the reacting
state and the acting state. Accordingly, Part IV of this essay deals with the
first component: the interest and concern of the reacting (affected) state.
Then, in Part V, I take up the issue of interaction leading to custom.
IV. WHY HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS GET STARTED

As we have seen, the Sovereignty Paradigm adopts a presumption that
reserves to a state an ill-defined bundle of internal competencies. The
Paradigm is willing to allow international law to arise from a state's
interactions with other states (the clearest example is war), because at least
those interactions involve more than one state and hence any assertion of
"sovereignty" by either state would lead nowhere. On the other hand, when
a state acts entirely internally-that is, where no other state is "present" and
there is no "interaction" between states-then the Sovereignty Paradigm
creates an almost conclusive presumption against the intrusion of any rule
of international law. Indeed, by acting internally, there is no "state practice"
visible to international law (state practice requires an interaction of two or
more states).
With these elaborations, it is clear that Professor Henkin views what a
government does to its own citizens within its own territory as an internal act

out of which customary law cannot arise. That presents for him a fundamental dilemma, because the law of human rights that he champions must apply
to what a government does to its own citizens within its own territory-if it
didn't, it would hardly be a human right. Professor Henkin concedes that the
international prohibitions of genocide, slavery, and torture apply to acts of
any government against any citizen, including acts of a citizen's own
government against that citizen. I have tried to show earlier that Professor
Henkin's resolution of this dilemma-inventing a strange source called "nonconventional law" or invoking the equally mysterious notion of "jus
cogens"-is no resolution at all. What remains is simply an anomaly. From
within the Sovereignty Paradigm no coherent explanation of human rights
norms in international law is possible.
I will now try to show that the Sovereignty Paradigm cannot explain that
which Professor Henkin takes for granted. Consider why a state cannot do
whatever it wants to any person within its territory. Why can it not maltreat,
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and deny justice to, an alien within its territory? According to Professor
Henkin:
Under customary international law, a state is obligated to
treat foreign nationals in accordance with an international
standard of justice, and is responsible to the state of the
person's nationality for any violations of that standard.'
Contrast this accurate statement of customary international law with what a
state can do to its own nationals. Stalin's purge of the 1930s was not
considered a violation of international law. On the other hand, if Stalin's
government at the same time had maltreated or denied justice to a single
foreigner in the Soviet Union, that person's government might have
demanded immediate redress through diplomatic circles, and newspapers
might have reported the maltreatment and atrocity.
Let us consider carefully why it is that a nation under traditional
customary law cannot deny justice to an alien within its territory, whereas
prior to 1939 it could do whatever it wanted to a national within its territory.
A human being is a human being; why was there such a disparity under
international law between a human being who is a national and a human
being who is an alien?
The disparity obviously did not arise by accident. It was the result of
what nations wanted international law to be in the years and centuries prior
to 1939. The prerequisite for the formation of any rule of international law,
whether customary or conventional, is a state's interestand concernin an act
or transaction. After all, international law is nothing but an invention of
states that serves their collective self-interest.
Several centuries ago, the interest of a nation in the plight of one of its
citizens travelling in a foreign country could be expressed by the phrase "he
is one of us." His fellow countrymen had empathy for his plight in a foreign
land because they could relate to him. This sense of "belonging" is summed
up in the term "national." His fellow citizens cared about him when he
travelled abroad. This care translated into the interest and concern of the
home nation in the welfare of one of its nationals who was being maltreated
by a foreign government in a foreign land. Let me be clear that in saying
this much, I have not yet taken up the question of how this interest and
concern helps to give rise to a rule of international law. The second step in

Id

at 40 n.32.
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the equation-namely, the interaction of the home state and the foreign
state-remains to be shown. Here, I am only saying that if we start with a
human being who finds himself in a foreign country and finds himself the
victim of a denial of justice by the government of that country, then that
person's fellow "nationals" in the home country might have expressed
interest and concern for his well-being.
Now I want to show that, as a result of the human rights revolution, our
interest and concern for fellow human beings have transcended national
boundaries. We now care about the plight of persons in foreign countries
even if they are not our "nationals." I am not saying that we necessarily
care as much about their welfare as we might care about the welfare of our
own nationals in foreign countries, but we do seem to care to the extent of
threats to their basic human rights.
Why is any nation in the world today concerned with the human rights of
foreigners in foreign countries? What has changed since Stalin's purges of
the 1930s? Professor Henkin has provided us with a number of reasons for
the human rights revolution, though he has omitted what I believe are the
two most important. The first involves concern. It is the result of the power
of television to create a bond of empathy about the plight of individuals in
far-away lands. David Hume in 1740 wrote about the consequences to
morality of the "sympathy" felt by one person when she sees another person
suffering and in pain. It is a human and instinctive reaction for the observer
to feel a little of that pain and suffering herself. The observer's feeling is
not exactly real, it is sympathetic (today we would call this "empathy").
Television has blanketed the world with live pictures of people suffering,
starving, and dying in foreign places. These pictures bring home to the
viewer a very deep empathetic reaction. The aggregate power of this
empathy in the population is translated into government levels (governmental
officials themselves are not entirely immune to the same empathy when they
watch television), with the result that a state decides that it indeed is
concerned with the plight of foreigners in foreign countries. The television
phenomenon has changed everyone's view of the world and has convinced
people everywhere that they have been, are, and should be concerned about
what happens to other people in other countries.
The second reason for the human rights revolution has to do with interest.
It is economic interest-the growth and spread of free markets. There is no
doubt that, with the end of the Cold War, Karl Marx is figuratively dead and
Adam Smith is thriving. The internal dynamic of free markets is their
tendency to spread to more and more countries and people. (It was Lenin,
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and not Smith or Marx, who noticed this dynamic in his analysis of capitalist
imperialism.) Free trade makes everyone better off by increasing the variety
of available goods and lowering their price (increasing the purchasing power
of the consumer). 7 The advantages of external free trade in turn promote
today's relentless drive in every country in the world toward internal free
trade, that is, private ownership of productive assets, trade among capital
producers, negotiations with workers-atomistic individuals engaging in the
transactions of capital markets. The "sovereign" in this picture (I use the
word apologetically) is the consumer. Advertising is pitched to the
consumer; alternatives are presented to the consumer; the consumer is wooed
by all these competing businesses. Thus, both the atomism of capital
markets and the concept of "the consumer is king" result in an overwhelming
demand for personal freedom. It has become increasingly difficult for any
government to shackle its citizens, to deny them the autonomy that they are
enjoying in the economic sphere. In the face of this world-wide capitalist
explosion, governments have responded by "downsizing"-selling off the
means of production to their own citizens and to outside investors.
Governments are taking an increasingly passive role as facilitators of
business initiatives. As I argued in an article written in 1979 when the Cold
War was still very much with us, "there is a fundamental affinity between
the goals of multinational business enterprise and the goals of human
rights."5" This affinity works both ways. It not only says that capitalist
enterprise is good for human rights, but also that human rights are good for
capitalist enterprise. Among numerous examples, the recent NAFTA debates
in the United States illustrate this point. Despite the rhetoric of labor-union
leaders that free trade with Mexico would result in the loss of jobs for
American workers,59 those workers supported the pact because of deepseated realization that their own standard of living, ti.eir own purchasing
power, will increase if more goods and services are generated more
inexpensively in foreign countries like Mexico. Another way of looking at
this is to note that Japan's current huge trade surplus means that many
people want, are willing to pay for, and have enjoyed the electronic and
automotive products that Japan has produced. Young people who used to

" See Paul Romer, New Goods, Old Theory and the Welfare Cost of Trade Restrictions,
J. DEvEL. ECON.

__

(1994).

4 Anthony D'Amato, Are Human Rights Goodfor International Business?, 1 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 22, 32 (1979).
59 More likely, the labor-union leaders feared a loss of their own jobs and perks.
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carry big loud radios around the streets ("ghetto blasters") are today
noiselessly plugged in to Sony Walkpersons and are enjoying a higher
fidelity (and higher volume) at a cheaper price than ever before. In short,
we have a present interest and concern in the economic freedom of foreign
persons in foreign countries, and this economic freedom supports and is
supported by political freedom.'
Our economic interest and empathetic concern for the human rights of
foreigners in foreign countries is now a psychological fact of human
existence. It directly runs up against the psychology of the Sovereignty
Paradigm. According to the latter, what goes on in a foreign country
between the government and its "own" people in its own territory is none of
our business. The human rights revolution, aided by the growth of television
and the spread of free markets, tells us on a daily basis that what goes on in
a foreign country is our business, and more so with the passage of time. We
are much more concerned with the internal affairs of our "trading partners"
(soon the whole world) than we were in the 1930s with what went on in the
Soviet Union-a time when international trade was minimal and where the
brutality of the purges were invisible to a nonexistent CNN television
network.
If centuries ago nations developed an interest and concern in the welfare
of their "nationals" when under the jurisdiction of foreign governments, we
need a word today to describe a similar interest and concern in the welfare
of "foreigners" when under the jurisdiction of foreign governments. Over
a decade ago I suggested the word "international" for this relationship. 1

' See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, A Peace Deal Today Really Is a Bargain, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1994, § 4, at 1. Mr. Friedman notes:
[P]eace has unexpectedly broken out in the Middle East, South Africa
and even Northern Ireland in the last 12 months....
There is no way an increasingly bourgeois Israeli society could read
every day about the phenomenal growth rates in Singapore or Thailand
without asking themselves: 'What are we doing wasting our time putting
up caravan homes ... in the West Bank?' There was an intuitive
understanding that a gravy train was passing them by.
'Global markets reward good economic performance and punish bad
economic performance more quickly than ever.'
6' Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1110 (1982):
[I]f A, a national of state X, is tortured by State X, State Y has an
international-law [sic] entitlement against X.... A, as it turns out, is an
"international" of State Y just as he is a "national" of State X.
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Thus, I can claim to be a "national" of the United States and "international"
of every other country. Thus, we care about our "internationals" starving in
Burundi or dying in a brutal civil war in Bosnia. Although our concern for
our "nationals" may be deeper and cover a wider array of rights, we also
care about the plight of our "internationals" in other countries. At the
present time we haven't developed our sensitivities to the point where we
care as much if foreign citizens are denied justice by their own governments
as we care if one of our citizens is denied justice by that same foreign
government. But this is just another way of saying that international human
rights are, at present writing, less inclusive than the constitutional rights
enjoyed by citizens in several countries. As an American "national" I have
certain constitutional rights that may be more extensive than my rights as an
"international." Yet in some venues it may turn out that my "international"
rights are more valuable than my "national" rights. (And, for some people
in some countries, their "international" rights may be more extensive than the
rights they have under their home country's constitution.) In any event, the
fact that both the "national" and "international" set of rights may overlap
does not present a conceptual problem.
Whether or not we use the cumbersome term "our internationals" or not,
breaking free of the Sovereignty Paradigm requires giving up the notion that
what one's own government does to one's own nationals is no other
country's business. Perhaps most people in the world today have overcome
whatever Sovereignty Paradigm they might have internalized sixty years ago.
Perhaps the only people who still seriously cling to it are law professors. Of
these law professors, one of the most prominent, who by virtue of his
commitment to human rights has the least reason to cling to it, is Professor
Henkin.
In short, the true meaning of the human rights revolution that Professor
Henkin talks about is a rising interest and concern about the rights of
foreigners in foreign countries. It is as if people all over the world are
coming to a sense of global consciousness that their own rights are better
secured in a world where everyone enjoys those rights. We have internationalized our interest and concern, and thus have taken the first necessary step
toward the formation of an international customary law of human rights.

d. at 1147. The word "international" is a bit cumbersome, and probably won't catch on. But
I think it remains useful for analytical purposes.
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V. How HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS GET STARTED
A. "State Practice"
In the previous section, under the rubric of a Neutral Paradigm that does
not presume against either people or states, I tried to show that states have
an increasingly developing interest and concern in what happens to
foreigners in foreign states. But that interest and concern, while it may
suffice to combat the psychological barrier raised by the Sovereignty
Paradigm, does not in itself amount to customary international law. A
second step is needed, namely, the interaction of two or more states, because
the mere fact that state M cares about what happens to people in state N is
not enough to create customary law. Unless there is some interaction
between M and N, M's interest and concern simply means that M (at best)
desires that there should be an international norm regulating N's conduct.
That desire does not translate into customary law unless there is an element
of state practice. The term "state practice" means an interaction of two or
more states on the international level. That interaction must be provable;
there must be evidence of state practice.
We recall that Professor Henkin said that human rights norms are "not
based on ... state practice at all." 2 Yet elsewhere in his paper he
conceded that "[u]nder customary international law, a state is obligated to
treat foreign nationals in accordance with an international standard of justice.
9"63

Professor Henkin has made two assertions: (1) the obligation to treat
foreign nationals in accordance with an international standard of just is a rule
of customary international law, and (2) customary international law is based
on state practice. Both assertions are undoubtedly correct. Yet under
Professor Henkin's Sovereignty Paradigm, we can now ask how assertion (1)
could ever have arisen. Where is the state practice that Professor Henkin
rightfully insists upon in order for a rule of custom to arise? I want to argue
that Professor Henkin cannot consistently maintain both that human rights
norms are not based on state practice and that the obligation to treat foreign
nationals in accordance with an international standard of justice is based on
state practice. I want to show that his assertions (1) and (2) logically compel
him to abandon his claim that human rights norms are not based on state

' Henkin, supra note 2, at 38.

6 d. at 40 n.32.
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practice. But I am not just interested in uncovering a logical inconsistency
in Professor Henkin's views; I want to show generally that, as a positive
matter, human rights norms are as much based on state practice as classical
norms such as the obligation to treat foreign nationals in accordance with an
international standard of justice.
B. A Thought Experiment
The historical records are scant, so I would like to proceed on the basis
of a thought experiment. Let us imagine a case of first impression, one that
could have arisen a century or two prior to the writings of Vattel (who
acknowledged that a state had an international obligation not to deny justice
towards aliens in its territory). Imagine that a person P, living and residing
in country C, travels to country D. While minding his own business walking
down a street in D, he is suddenly arrested. He is taken to the police station,
beaten, and thrown into prison. He is not charged with any violation of D's
laws. P's relatives and friends back in C obtain the support of officials of
government C to bring diplomatic pressure upon officials of government D.
Assume that C's diplomatic protest is the first time a country ever lodged a
protest regarding maltreatment of its national.
For the very reason that this is a case of first impression, the prior "law"
on the subject must have been in favor of D.' What this means is as
follows: a person P, from any country (say, C) would, upon entering upon
the territory of another country (say, D) become fully subject to the
jurisdiction of D just like any other person within D. P's outside nationality,
that is his C-nationality, would be irrelevant once P is physically present in
D. By entering into the territory of D, P has subjected himself to D's
sovereign power. D can do whatever it wants to do, to any of its own
nationals within D as well as to any visitors present within D, such as P.
Since this is well before the era of human rights, there is no legal limit
whatsoever on what the government of D can do to any person within D.
However, under our hypothetical, C has issued a protest on behalf of P.
C contends that D has some obligations toward P. The degree of D's

" In my view, the idea that there are "gaps" in the law is incoherent. The law is a binary
system. In any case, either the plaintiff wins or the plaintiff loses. If there is no "legal
matter" the plaintiff can cite to that would win for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff loses. The
lack of "legal matter" is simply another way of saying that, under the law, the defendant wins.
See Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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obligations toward P can be located somewhere between D's obligations
toward its own nationals, which is a zero degree of obligation (from an
international law standpoint in the pre-human rights era), and D's obligations
toward C's ambassadors who are physically present within D. At one
extreme end of the scale, C's ambassadors enjoy diplomatic immunity from
D's legal jurisdiction. At the other end of the scale, P, as an ordinary
national of C is not a diplomat, and is subject to the legal jurisdiction of D.
(The same is true today, as tourists are constantly reminded by their own
governments when they travel abroad.) But in between the two ends of the
scale, C asserts that P has some rights by virtue of the fact that he is a
foreigner within D. Those rights boil down to C's claim that D cannot
"deny justice" to P. International law, C says, requires that D observe some
very minimal justice standards (Americans might call them "due process
standards") toward P simply because P is not a national of D. In C's view,
P enjoys a right when travelling in D that the nationals of D do not have,
namely, the right under international law not to be the victim of a denial of
justice at the hands of the government of D.
Despite C's advocacy on the diplomatic level, if P's case had been
presented in any international court, the court would have held in favor of
D. This holding is simply a consequence of our initial assumption: that P's
is a "case of first impression" where the particular right being claimed was
never previously given judicial vindication. In other words, under international law, C would have no claim against D. There is no "state practice"
that C can cite in favor of recognizing any rights of P within the territory of
D. Of course, there is a great deal of "state practice" that D can cite,
namely, the fact that in all prior cases, when a foreigner entered any
territory, that foreigner was at the mercy of the territorial sovereign and
international law had nothing to say about it.
Of critical importance here is that C's argument (that P cannot be denied
justice by D by virtue of the fact that P is a national of C) will make no
impression on the court. The term "nationality" has no legal significance in
this case of first impression. The court's opinion will point out that
"nationality" is a relationship between C and P, and therefore whether P is
a "national" of C is entirely dependent upon the laws of C. (This remains
true today.) The court will then go on to say that C's laws, including its
"nationality" laws, can only have effect within the territorial jurisdiction of
C. C's laws do not have extraterritorial effect. C's laws of "nationality"
cannot be binding upon D. In short, "nationality" within C is a relationship
that is predicated upon the laws of C, and exhausts its power when the laws

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 25:47

of C cease to apply. International law imposes no obligation on D to respect
C's legislation concerning nationality.
The court might add that P's case is entirely different from that of C's
ambassadors resident in D. When C's ambassadors entered D, they presented their credentials to the government of D. D's government accepted
those credentials. Under well-established international legal norms of
diplomatic immunity, the acceptance of those credentials meant that D agreed
to allow C's ambassadors diplomatic immunity within D, just as D's
ambassadors, after presenting their credentials to C, enjoyed diplomatic
immunity in C.
If customary international law was unchangeable, if it retained the content
it had in ancient Babylonia, then today Professor Henkin could not make the
statement I have previously quoted several times: that "[u]nder customary
international law, a state is obligated to treat foreign nationals in accordance
with an international standard of justice.. . ." That obligation simply did
not exist in the early days of complete national sovereignty over any
individuals within the national territory. Those prevailing rules of customary
law certainly were not changed by statute, since no world legislature has ever
existed that could change the rules of international law. So, something must
have happened. Something must have effected a change in customary law.
The only thing that could have changed was state practice. Since I have
chosen the C-D case as a thought experiment describing the pivotal casethe case that inaugurated a change in the preexisting rule of international law
reserving domestic jurisdiction over any person to the territorial sovereign-the C-D case must have unfolded in such a way as to change state
practice.
The C-D case, as I have described it, did not come before a court.
Although I discussed what a court might have held in that case--that the
court would have awarded the decision to D on the basis of preexisting
law-the case itself was not adjudicated in court. If it had been adjudicated
in court, there would have been no change in the law, because international
courts cannot change customary law; they must apply it as it is. Customary
law only changes by virtue of a change in state practice. What international
courts hold is not "state practice."'
We will assume some further events in the C-D case. Since these events

6 Henkin, supra note 2, at 40 n.32.
6However, a national court deciding a case of international law is engaging in state
practice. For an enumeration of reasons, see Doehring, supra note 8.
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must have occurred at some time or other, we are entitled to assume that
they occurred whenever state practice changed. We proceed on the
assumption that the C-D case is the one in which state practice changed.
Recall that in our hypothetical case P's relatives and friends back in C
obtained the support of official of government C to bring diplomatic pressure
upon officials of government D. C's ambassadors might first argue that D
cannot deny justice to P because P is a "national" of C, but as we have seen,
this argument is an empty formality. D can argue that "nationality" is a
relationship dependent upon C's law only, and C's law does not extend to
D's territory. Next, C's ambassadors argue that C has a strong interest and
concern in P's welfare, not just because P is a "national" of C in the legal
sense, but also because the term "national" symbolized the web of ancestral
and familial relationships that make P "one of us" for whom we extend our
support. C might also add that C is prepared, on a reciprocal basis, to
extend to any nationals of D who may visit C the same right not to be
"denied justice" at C's hands. On this reciprocity argument, D might counter
that (1) it does not care about its own citizens and their welfare if they travel
abroad, or (2) its own citizens do not do much travelling, because D is a
beautiful, self-sufficient country and no one wants to travel to dingy C. (I
mention this reciprocity argument, and how it might be countered, because
"reciprocity" does not always account for the formation of customary rules
of law, e.g., land-locked states have no reciprocal interest in granting to
coastal states a wide territorial sea.)
D might reply that P loses his "nationality" rights when he voluntarily
enters D, and that C should not have any interest or concern in a person who
leaves C's territory. However, this is only an argument, and as such cannot
be conclusive upon C because either C has an interest and concern in P's
welfare or C does not have that interest and concern. Nothing D says can
change C's interest and concern because interest and concern are facts. C
can demonstrate its interest and concern in P's welfare both by insisting on
the diplomatic level that it has interest and concern in his welfare, and by
indicating that it is willing to back up this interest and concern by appropriate countermeasures if D does not immediately release P from prison and
either pay him a sum of money to recompense him for the maltreatment or
at least assure C that it will never again deny justice to any national of C.
Suppose the ambassadors of C and D have reached a stalemate; no further
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arguments work.67 C decides to take a forceful step on behalf of its
national P. C threatens to take a particular "countermeasure" (this is C's
terminology, not D's at this point) unless D releases P from prison and pays
C a sum of money on P's behalf that C can use to compensate P for P's
injuries." Suppose C threatens to seize a public vessel of D's that is
presently docked in one of C's ports, to sell the vessel at auction, to deduct
a substantial sum of money from the sale for the injury and incarceration of
P,and to remit the balance of the proceeds of sale, if any, to D. Let us call
this the "vessel initiative." D immediately replies that it would regard the
vessel initiative by C as an unjustified and provocative act of war.
The issue now is joined: whether the vessel initiative is a "countermeasure" or an "act of war." From D's point of view it is an act of war, one
that is entirely unjustified, unjustified because D regards its maltreatment of
P as a matter within its sovereign jurisdiction for which it is accountable to
no other state. C, on the other hand, regards D's maltreatment of P as
unjustified and giving rise to a legitimate claim for redress. Since C's
request for redress was rejected by D, C believes it has the right to engage
in what I have elsewhere called a "reciprocal entitlement violation." 69 C
believes that it can take an entitlement of D, in this case, D's property right
in its own vessel currently docking in one of C's ports, and violate that right
as a proportionate punishment ("countermeasure") against D for D's
maltreatment of P. It is a "tit-for-a-different-tat," in the terminology I've
previously suggested, 0 because C has violated an entitlement of D that is
quite unrelated to D's delict. If, for example, C had maltreated a national
67 In

other words, C's "diplomatic protest" has been to no avail. C must either give up

and go home or escalate the matter by threatening to take forcible measures. A threat to take
forcible measures is more than a protest; it is an act that could result in counter-threats
escalating into war. Some writers think that a mere protest is enough to form customary law;
I believe they are mistaken. See Anthony D'Amato, Protests,INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra
note 8, at 107-10.
68In classic international law, P had no standing. P's injuries, if any, were reconceptualized as injuries to P's state C. See generally INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 31215 (excerpting EDwIN M. BORcHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CTIZENS ABROAD
OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1915); HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (2d ed. 1952); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROCESS AND
PROSPEcr

(1987) (adapted with modifications)).

69Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Law"?: The "ReciprocalEntitlements
Violation" Argument, INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 41-48.
70Anthony D'Amato, A Reformation of Customary Law: The Quantitative Element (Ac
Abstention or Committment), INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 70-73.
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of D, it would have been a "tit-for-tat" response."
So now we are down to brass tacks. Either C's vessel initiative is a
countermeasure or it is an unjustified and provocative act of war. Which is
it? Nothing in my statement of the C-D case can provide us an answer to
this question because all I can do is set up the categories on behalf of C and
D. But the answer is, in fact, known. What actually happened is that D
gave in and accepted C's characterization of C's act as a countermeasure.
Of course we don't know at what point in the C-D interaction that D gave
in. D might have conceded the entire matter when C made its threat to seize
D's vessel, or D might have been stubborn and held out, and C might have
been forced to seize the vessel and sell it at auction and retain a portion of
the proceeds. If C had taken these actual steps, then the choice was D's
whether to regard C's action as an act of war and forcibly retaliate or to
simply accept the "punishment" and consider the matter settled.
How do we know for sure that C prevailed? We know it from the
historical fact that there had to be a first case that changed the old rule in
favor of D (the rule of complete territorial sovereignty) to a new rule in
favor of C (the rule that C's nationals temporarily present in D are entitled
to a level of treatment by D that does not fall below a standard that could be
called "denial of justice"). Since there had to be a first case when the old
rule changed, that first case is, by definition, our C-D case.72

71

The "tit-for-tat" response, though apparently more just on its face, actually can be more
unstable, spiraling downward until both nations end up in a war. See D'Amato, supra note
69, at 45-48.
' Why did D give in when previous states in D's position did not? Over the course of
years, or even of centuries, values change. In earlier times, states regarded people as
expendable and worth very little. But human worth grew over time. At some point it was
inevitable that a person's (P's) relatives and friends would make enough of a fuss over P's
plight in a foreign country as to enlist the home country's support on behalf of P. We can't
identify the first case when this happened, but we know that it did happen. The stability of
the international system dictated the result in the C-D case. Prior to the C-D case, the
stability of the international system was served by allowing territorial sovereigns complete
freedom of action within their territory vis-a-vis foreign nationals. But this freedom of action
at some point in time was perceived to cause a danger to the stability of the international
system, a danger because human life had become more valuable and, consequently, worth
going to war about. So, system stability dictated a new rule, that territorial sovereigns should
be constrained by certain minimal standards regarding the treatment of foreign nationals.
Today, as more human-rights norms become part of international law, we can see that the
international system continues to act to preserve stability. Certain acts by governments
against their own citizens are seen to be outrageous and unwarranted. Other nations express

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 25:47

The C-D case displays state practice that generated customary law. The
state practice consisted of an interaction between C and D. This interaction
was not just on the verbal level of arguments by ambassadors of both
countries. The interaction proceeded at least to the level of a threat of
forcible action. A threat of forcible action is state practice, and the nation
that receives the threat can engage in retaliatory action. The interaction
between C and D, on the other hand, might have extended to the conclusion
of the countermeasure (C might have seized and sold the vessel). But there
is no doubt that a threat by one state to use force against the interests of
another state (here, D's property interest in its vessel), and/or the carrying
out of such a threat, is "state practice." When D gave up, a new rule of
customary law was created, a rule to the effect that if another nation
maltreats foreigners within its territory at least as badly as the way D treated
P, their home states have a right to engage in proportionate reciprocal
entitlement violations against that state. More simply stated, the rule of
international law has now become the one summarized by Professor Henkin:
"Under customary international law, a state is obligated to treat foreign
nationals in accordance with an international standard of justice...."'
How can Professor Henkin say that this early human-rights norm, the right
of a person visiting a foreign country not to be denied justice by that foreign
country, is "not based on state practice at all"? He can only say this because
his Sovereignty Paradigm allows him to notice just D's actions within D!
Professor Henkin "sees" D maltreating P as a purely internal matter, just as
today he "sees" acts of genocide, apartheid, and torture as purely internal
acts of states. He concedes that these acts violate international norms, but
his Sovereignty Paradigm disables him from explaining how the international
norms arose.
What he cannot "see" is the entire dimension of interactive state practice
regarding these norms. In the C-D case, he focuses on what happens to P

interest and concern in the well-being of these foreigners (these "internationals").

If the

acting government continues to act with impunity, international reprisals (economic sanctions
and ultimately forcible intervention) are threatened.
' Henidn, supra note 2, at 40 n.32. By the time of the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Claims
Commission that investigated numerous "denial of justice" claims in the 1920s, still decades
before the human rights revolution, the customary law on the subject was so universally
accepted and understood that the reports of the Commission are almost entirely devoted to
a detailed account of the facts of each case, the "law" being uncontroversial. For an account
of these cases, see Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel, State Responsibility for the
Exportation of Nuclear Power Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1031 (1988).
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within D's territory, but cannot "see" the threat by C to engage in reciprocal
entitlement violations and D's decision to back down in the face of the
threat. Or, if the threat was carried out, Professor Henkin still would be
unable to "see" what C did (seizing the vessel) as related to D's act
(maltreating P). In short, by focusing exclusively on P's plight in D's
territory, Professor Henkin does not see the C-D interaction and thus does
not see state practice.
He cannot see state practice because he is a prisoner of the Sovereignty
Paradigm, which disables him from seeing that D's acts have engaged

retaliatory countermeasures from other states. He is still rooted in the belief
that what a nation does within its own territory is its own business, and thus
C's threats to take countermeasuresare viewed as extra-legal intrusions in
the case. It is like the scientists described by Kuhn who interpret certain
measurements as anomalies or errors rather than reconceptualizing their
theories to account for these new measurements. The Sovereignty Paradigm
disables its adherents from including within their legal vision the state
practice I have described as the C-D interaction. They think what C does is
irrelevant, and they think that D's reaction is irrelevant, because they believe
that all the legally relevant action occurs within D's territory.
Thus, any human rights norm is viewed by adherents to the Sovereignty
Paradigm as an inexplicable intrusioninto territorial sovereignty. They don't
know how or why these human norms arose (they give us vague and illusory
"explanations" like "non-conventional" law, jus cogens, national constitutions, the Zeitgeist of the World, etc.), yet they are willing to acknowledge
the norms when everybody else does. However, they continue to regard
them with suspicion because they are "derogations" from territorial
sovereignty, and they are slow to acknowledge any new ones.
A Neutral Paradigm that does not exclude relevant evidence would display
a great deal of state practice accompanying the rise of human rights norms
since 1945. The economic sanctions and boycotts against South Africa may
have made the difference in South Africa's decision to dismantle apartheid
and to move toward a multi-racial democracy. Economic sanctions today
against Serbia constitute the response of nations outside Yugoslavia who
have an interest and concern in the protection of the citizens in Bosnia
against genocide and mass rape. I've argued that the military interventions
by the United States in Grenada and Panama should be viewed as human
rights interventions (although other people interpret those interventions
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differently).74 As I write these words, the United States is contemplating
military intervention in Haiti, and spokespersons for the Clinton Administration are emphasizing human rights violations in Haiti above all other reasons
for the possible intervention."
These economic sanctions and military interventions, threatened and
actual, are only the most prominent examples of scores of instances since
1945 of state action to lend support to persons against the human rights
depredations of their own governments. All of these reactions by the
international community constitute "reciprocal entitlement violations." They
are inexplicable except as "countermeasures" to violations of the growing
international law of human rights. The Sovereignty Paradigm is blind to the
legal significance of all these economic sanctions and threatened (and
imposed) military interventions. Professor Henkin does not view these
countermeasures as constituting state practice; he says that the "nonconventional" law of human rights "is not based on ...state practice at
all."76 On the contrary, they are the most manifest and important examples
of state practice in the recent history of international law.
The importance of the threat of intervention with respect to the emerging
human right to democratic governance, one that somehow failed to make
Professor Henkin's list,77 is found in the Moscow Document, signed by
thirty-seven states, which declares that the participating states:

74See DEBATE: Resolved that the U.S. Intervention in Panama Violated International
Law, in INT'L LAw ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 208-25 (excerpting Ved P. Nanda, The
Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J.INT'L
L. 494 (1990); Tom J.Farer, Panama: Beyond the CharterParadigm,84 AM. J.INT'L L.
503 (1990); Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990); Sarah A. Rumage, Panama and the Myth of Humanitarian
Intervention in U.S. Foreign Policy: Neither Legal Nor Moral, Neither Just Nor Right, 10
AiuZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1993); TESON, supra note 48.
" The threat turned out to suffice; military intervention was not needed to restore the
Aristide government.
76 Henkin, supra note 2, at 38.
77 See Democracy, INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8 at 367-80 (excerpting Thomas
M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
Babacar Ndiaye, International Cooperation to Promote Democracy and Human Rights:
Principles and Programmes, 49 INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS REV. 23 (1992) and including
Anthony D'Amato, What Kind of Democrary Do We Want to Export?, INT'L LAw
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 373-80).
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will support vigorously, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted
overthrow of a legitimately elected government of a participating State by undemocratic means, the legitimate organs
of that State upholding human rights, democracy and the
rule of law, recognizing their common commitment to
countering any attempt to curb these basic values. 8
If any student of international law as late as the 1930s had said that theform
of government of a state is any foreign state's concern, that person would
have been drummed out of the international law academy. But in the closing
decade of the twentieth century, people have come to realize that a
democratic government, while not a perfect form of government, may be the
best internal safeguard of human rights. The Moscow Document makes this
reasoning explicit. A norm of international law is emerging that prohibits
a nation from overthrowing its own democratic government. The Moscow
Document should drive the last few nails into the coffin of the Sovereignty
Paradigm. Alas, the latter will live co-extensively with the lives of its
adherents. It's easier to change the world than to change the world-view of
some law professors. When Professor Henkin said that "law professors are
a conservative lot," 9 he may not have appreciated how close to home, or
how understated, his observation really was.

C. Treaties as a Mode of State Practice
Finally, we need to take up the question of the definition and content of
the new human rights norms. If my argument so far is accepted, we have
located the source of these norms in state practice. But the formation of
customary norms in cases like the C-D interaction previously described will
not yield the specificity we desire. To get this specificity, we, of course,
cannot dispense with state interactions and state practice. What we need to
do is to find evidence of that practice in another place. It is the most
obvious place of all.
Consider the thought experiment just concluded in which I tried to show
the dimension of state practice involved in a pivotal case in which a

' Moscow Document, supra note 45, at 1677.
Henkin, supra note 2, at 43.
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customary rule changed content due to the interaction of the two affected
states. It is clear that most rules of customary international law have not
arisen this way. If they did, states would move to the brink of war whenever
a customary rule of international law was perceived by one state to have
outlived its usefulness. Fortunately, international law has long recognized
a mechanism for change in the rules of customary international law that does
not require brinkmanship. The mechanism is absurdly simple, and has been
with us since time immemorial. Only another paradigm, the Contract
Paradigm, has prevented a number of scholars from seeing it.'
The mechanism is the international agreement. In the C-D thought
experiment discussed above, there would have been no need for C to threaten
the deprivation of one of D's entitlements in order to protect its national.
All C had to do was to secure D's agreement in advance of the incident. A
treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between C and D could have
provided that the parties guarantee to each other's nationals a minimum
standard of treatment.
Many international law scholars, including most of those who studied law
in the United Kingdom or the United States, carry around in their minds an
almost impervious Contract Paradigm. It goes as follows. A treaty is simply
a contract between states. Like any other contract, its provisions apply only
to the parties. (There is a limited exception for extending contract provisions
to third-party beneficiaries, but contract obligations cannot be so extended.)
The contract creates a mini-regime of "law" just for the parties. The parties
are free in their contract to derogate from the general law applicable to
everyone or to reinforce that law if they so choose.8 '
8 Some readers may think that all the attention I gave in this article to the Sovereignty

Paradigm indicated that it was my main scholarly bete-noire. Far from it; it is only recently,
in the context of thinking through the customary law of human rights, that I've come to see
the distorting effect of the Sovereignty Paradigm. Instead, it is the Contract Paradigm that
has played a central role in the work I have done on international law theory in the past
quarter century. It is the first thing I grappled with as a student in Richard Baxter's seminar
in international law during my law school days, the first thing I wrote about in a full-length
article, and the centerpiece of my 1971 book on custom. But this is the first time that I have
labelled it the "Contract Paradigm." The terminology is unimportant, the concept has been
a preoccupation of my entire academic career.
There is an exception here for contracts whose substantive provisions violate public
policy, such as a contract to commit a murder or a contract for the delivery of prohibited
substances. Under municipal contract law, such provisions are void and unenforceable. The
international law analogue are treaties whose provisions violate jus cogens. The unsolved
problem in international law is not that jus cogens is possible, but rather, how does it arise
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Armed with the Contract Paradigm, international law scholars conclude
that the provisions in any treaty cannot affect the general customary law
applicable to all states. They believe that a treaty, like a contract, can only
create law for the parties. No amount of logical persuasion, no amount of
empirical evidence, can dislodge this faith that treaties are just like contracts.
I must admit that I sometimes feel like a few individuals must have felt prior
to the sixteenth century when they said that evidence and logical deduction
proved that the earth was round. By venturing to make such an assertion the
teeth of the prevailing Flat Earth Paradigm, these individuals risked being
imprisoned, drawn, and quartered.
No matter how much empirical evidence is adduced, paradigms like the
Contract Paradigm and the Flat Earth Paradigm like invading armies trump
the evidence of our senses and the logic of our intellects. Nearly everyone
in Western Civilization for the five thousand years prior to 1500 (when
Copernicus' astronomical observations were beginning to be published)
believed that the earth was flat and motionless, that if you dug down into the
earth you would reach solid rock and if you kept going you would reach
Hell. They believed that boats that sailed beyond the horizon were in danger
of falling off the earth and plunging into the everlasting abyss. They
believed that the sun travelled across the sky during the day. Above the
visible sky lurked the Kingdom of Heaven. 2
How did all these people prior to Copernicus explain the ability of the
sun, once it had set in the West, to get all the way around to the east again
so that it could rise the next day? The sun could not circle around the earth
because the earth was flat and below it was Hell. So, many people simply
despaired of explaining the motion of the sun. Various religious explanations were proffered-gods transporting the sun across the heavens in a
golden chariot. Others assumed that when the sun set in the west, its light
went out. Then the sun could reverse its journey in the dark so that it could
get back to the east by the next morning and light up again. However, no
astronomer was able to find a dark disk moving across the sky during the
night, so the sun must have been particularly clever at hiding its return trip.
The most simple explanation-that the sun's apparent motion was simply
how we saw it aboard a round earth that was revolving-was blasphemous.
Believers in the Flat Earth Paradigm were confronted with the evidnece
of meteorites. They could observe in some places a huge crater, and in the
and how can it be modified? See supra, note 20.
8' Governed, no doubt, by Someone with the world's greatest Sovereignty Paradigm.
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middle of it (if one dug a hole) an enormous sunken boulder. The simple
explanation would have been that a rock fell from the sky and impacted the
earth, causing the crater. But anyone who said this could be tortured at an
Inquisition or burned at the stake, because it was uncontrovertible common
sense that rocks are so heavy that they could not possibly have gotten from
the earth into the sky in the first place. But there was a standard explanation
that was consistent with the Paradigm: meteorites were rocks that bubbled
up from Hell. Since the rocks from Hell were fire-hot, there was a huge
splash when they surfaced. This splash is the crater.
I wish that scholars today could look at all the evidence and the logic that
contradicts the Contract Paradigm. But paradigms are difficult to dislodge
because they govern the way that we interpret the evidence and logic. No
amount of empirical evidence regarding meteors would have convinced
people five hundred years ago that rocks could go up into the air and fall
back down. Even if some people had actually observed a meteor land on
earth and told everyone what they had seen, they would have been
disbelieved and regarded as suffering from a collective delusion. If I ask
people to read Emmerich de Vattel's Law of Nations 3 with an open mind
and see where Vattel got his international law from, no one is willing to take
me up. At least in science, other scientists are willing to read the result of
empirical observations and experimentation. But in international law, it is
hard to convince anyone to replicate an experiment or observe something
that they are not predisposed to see.
Vattel and Blackstone wrote the two main treatises on law at the time of
the American Revolution. The founding fathers had both volumes in their
libraries. Blackstone's Commentaries were regarded as the authoritative
source for domestic law, and Vattel's Law of Nations the authoritative source
for international law. No single work on international law has even enjoyed
an influence comparable to Vattel's." Vattel was a "positivist" in that he
did not cite Scripture or "natural law" for the source or rules, the way that
Grotius had done before him. In fact, Vattel did not use citations. The
prevailing standards of scholarship in his day did not require revealing one's
sources. This fact means that we have to expend some effort in tracing back
to determine where Vattel's rules of customary law came from, an effort that

8

E.

DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS; OU, PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES

(1758).
" Lassa Oppenheim's Law of Nations may have had as important an influence on Japan's

A LAW CONDUrE LETAUX AFFAIRS DES NATIONS Fr DES SOUVERAINS

view of international law at the start of the twentieth century.
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requires the kind of time that most busy scholars of international law do not
have.
I submit that Vattel used as his source of rules of customary international
law the more than one thousand treaties that were available for his perusal.
These treaties were mainly bilateral, although by Vattel's day there were
some multilateral treaties involving a handful of countries (usually the result
of a peace settlement). Vattel regarded these treaties as containing the
"positive" rules of international law, i.e., the rules that states actually
adopted. The treaties covered the same topics that Vattel covered in his
treatise: state boundaries, diplomatic immunity, rights of aliens, belligerency
and neutrality law, and the like. 5 I have found upon examination that the
rules contained in these treaties had the same content as the rules of
customary international law expounded by Vattel. The conclusion is
obvious: Vattel used the treaties as a source of general customary international law.
Although regarded as a "positivist," Vattel emphatically was not a prisoner
of the Contract Paradigm. If he had been, then he could not have made
generalizations from the treaties he studied. Rather, he would have had to
say, for example, that the international law rule between England and France
is one thing (deriving from their treaties of 1403 and 1521), the rule between
France and Holland is slightly different (deriving from their bilateral treaty
of 1675), and so forth. Instead, Vattel took the provisions from these and
other treaties, and generalized from them. The treaties simply created, for
Vattel, rules of customary international law that were binding on all states.
Nor was this conclusion idiosyncratic with Vattel. In the first place,
Vattel's book was extraordinarily influential, its influence extending to the
invocations of international law in the United States Constitution and in the
organic legislation of the First Congress. Secondly, Vattel's "positivist"
followers used the same methodology. They simply updated Vattel's views
by consulting treaties that were entered into after the publication of Vattel's
treatise. By the time of Oppenheim's First Edition at the start of the
twentieth century, the Vattellian prescriptions were regarded as bedrock rules
of international custom.
One could take the curious position-like the ancient's view of the sun
sneaking back across the sky from west to east during the nighttime-that
Vattel accepted only those treaty provisions that codified preexisting rules of

' It is interesting that with one transposition of letters, the word "treaties" becomes the
word "treatise."
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international customary law. In my teacher Richard Baxter's phrase, a treaty
can provide "evidence" of the underlying customary rule." But how can
we tell whether a particular provision in a treaty is "evidence" of an existing
customary rule or is in derogation of that rule? The only way we can tell is
if we already know what the underlying rule of customary law is. If we
know the content of the customary rule, then we can place it alongside the
treaty and see if the treaty is consistent with it or derogates from it. But if
our goal is determining what the rule of customary law is, why would we go
to the trouble of determining whether a provision in a treaty is or is not
consistent with the rule? So long as we already know what the customary
rule is, we surely cannot care very much whether a particular treaty is or is
not consistent with it. To say that a treaty rule that we find to be consistent
with the underlying customary rule is "evidence" of that rule does not add
to our information about the customary rule. It does not tell us, for example,
why a treaty rule that is inconsistent with the underlying customary rule
would not be evidence of a new and contrary rule of custom. Indeed, within
the Contract Paradigm, the entire enterprise of looking into treaties for
custom is otiose because treaty provisions can have no impact upon general
customary law.
The more interesting question is the psychological one: why have so
many scholars like Professor Baxter written about the relation of treaties to
custom, only to conclude that treaties are like contracts and therefore have
no necessary relation to custom? They have done so, I submit, because of
a sense of uneasiness, of cognitive dissonance. They are good enough
scholars to see the vast evidence all around them that provisions in treaties
transmute into norms of customary law. What they cannot understand is the
mechanism by which this transmutation takes place. And the reason they
cannot see the mechanism is that they are captives of the Contract Paradigm.
If a scholar could possibly replace his or her Contract Paradigm with a
Neutral Paradigm, the academic situation would improve markedly. One
could then look at treaties unaccompanied by the baggage of domestic
contract law. A treaty is after all an international instrument: there is no
necessary reason why it should conform to the domestic law of contracts. 7

8Richard Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41
BYIL 275 (1965-66).
' Indeed, wholly apart from the thesis that provisions in treaties generate customary
norms, there are numerous substantive differences between treaties and contracts. For a

detailed study of these differences, see

ANTHONY

D'AMATO,

INTERNATIONAL LAW
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One's eyes would then be opened to see the vast and virtually uncontradicted
evidence throughout the history of international law of treaty provisions
generating rules of customary international law binding upon all states. This
is more true today than ever before, because all the human rights norms that
are the subject of this Colloquium were generated by multilateral conventions.
What is the precise logical mechanism by which provisions in treaties
become a source of international customary law? For this I refer the
interested reader to my previous detailed work on this question, which would
be too long (because it necessarily ties in with the mechanism of customary
law generation in the absence of treaties) to try to summarize here. 8
CONCLUSION

Professor Henkin is surely right that human rights norms have become part
of customary international law binding on all states. But he has not given
us a satisfactory explanation of the source of these norms. Calling them
"non-conventional" only hides the problem. Yet it is fundamentally
important to find a source for the norms; otherwise, they remain vague,
inchoate, and arguable, and strike many people outside the international law
profession as illusory.
Even within the profession, there are scholars like Professor Weisburd who
believe that human rights norms do not exist apart from treaty provisions
(that bind only the parties). Professor Weisburd's position flies in the face
of the uncontrovertible conclusion reached by Professor Henkin and most
other scholars that human rights norms are clearly a part of today's
customary international law. Yet it is clear that Professor Weisburd's
position reflects his unease with the question of sources. As a captive of the
Contract Paradigm, Professor Weisburd is unable to see the vast evidence of

80-98 (1994). Indeed, an argument the other way around can be made: that
we really should have a Treaty Paradigm that explains treaties and to some extent explains
contracts. See INT'L LAW AUTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 86-89.
u Anthony D'Amato, Treaties as a Source of General Rules of InternationalLaw, 3
HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1962); D'AMATO, supra note 33, at 103-66; Anthony D'Amato, The
Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110 (1982); Anthony
D'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of the Sea Convention, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1983);
Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988); INT'L LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 8, at 94-101; ANTHONY
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 146-203 (2d ed. 1995).
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treaties as a source of customary law.
I submit that the only logically satisfying and empirically validating
position to take on the source of human rights norms is that they derive from
provisions in treaties. But people who are prisoners of the Contract
Paradigm are disabled from taking such a position. I can only hope that
with the passage of time this Paradigm, like the Sovereignty Paradigm, will
gently erode, and that a new generation of scholars will look back on these
paradigms as archaic curiosities and wonder what all the fuss was about.

